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ABSTRACT
Scholarly discussion has treated the account of the state of nature which
Locke presents in his Second Treatise as neither an hypothesis nor a
description but rather as a fiction. John Dunn, for example, claims that
it is a ‘theoretical analysis of the fundamental relations of right and duty
which obtain between human beings, relations which are logically prior
to the particular historical situations in which all actual human beings
always in fact find themselves’. Here Dunn presents a misleading
account of Locke’s argument, presumably, as the title of his paper
suggests, in order to mount an argument of his own about the ‘political
relevance’ of Locke’s work to a time when no one takes seriously the
early modern idea of the state of nature. However, this article also has
a more serious concern. I argue that the representation of the state of
nature as a merely imaginary, ‘theoretical analysis’ of social relations
obscures the significance of the early modern idea of a state of nature,
not only for the work of Locke and his near contemporaries, but also,
more importantly, for the broader development of western social and
political thought. The idea of an original condition of freedom and
equality played a central role in Locke’s argument, serving as a means
both to undermine the view that humans were born into a natural
condition of subjection to the rule of others and to justify European
expropriation of land in the Americas. It also represented one end of a
developmental continuum, running from the original, most primitive,
condition of humanity through to the societies of contemporary western
Europe, which was thought to encompass all sections of humanity.
While the idea of an original asocial condition on which this continuum
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was based was later brought into question, a closely related develop-
mental framework nevertheless informed later movements in history
and the social sciences. After being abandoned in its original form, this
category was finally revived in 20th-century political theory, this time
precisely in the form that Dunn mistakenly ascribes to Locke. The article
concludes by speculating on the relationship between these normative
and empirical perspectives on the state of nature.
Key words development, indigenous peoples, John Locke,
modern social thought, state of nature
A recent article in this journal documents the demise of the myth of the prim-
itive in western scholarly thought (Kurasawa, 2002; see also Kurasawa, 2004).
The author laments this development, arguing that the myth played an
important part in enabling modernity to cultivate a cross-cultural mode of
critique, and consequently that its passing has shattered ‘one of the mirrors
through which western thinkers were able to interrogate their own societies’,
thus opening up the prospect of a ‘withdrawal of the western human sciences
to their own cultural horizons’ (Kurasawa, 2002: 3, 15).
Kurasawa’s interesting and provocative discussion invites two sceptical
responses. First, we could ask whether the cross-cultural mode of critique
to which he refers might not be seen as purveying precisely the narcissism
which has been neatly skewered in the title and opening chapter of Dipesh
Chakrabarty’s Provincializing Europe (2000) and again in Ranajit Guha’s
History at the Limit of World History (2002). This has encouraged western
thinkers to see other cultures as minor, and often lesser, variations on their
own. Accordingly, we might wonder why the collapse of this narcissism
should be viewed in negative rather than positive terms, that is, as presenting
a problem for western social thought and not as a sign of improvement. We
might suggest, second, that the narcissism of modernity relies less on the idea
of a primitive other than it does on the cosmopolitan gesture of appropri-
ating for the West the position as the highest stage yet achieved in a line of
progressive development which is seen as including all sections of humanity.1
Unlike the myth of the primitive, this cosmopolitan vision is alive and well
(Helliwell and Hindess, 2005).
This article focuses on one aspect of the early development of this modern
conceit. Kurasawa places the early modern contract theorists, Hobbes, Locke
and Rousseau, at the heart of his account of the first stage in the modern
history of the myth of the primitive (Kurasawa, 2002: 3–7). My discussion
focuses on John Locke’s account of the state of nature, arguing that it repre-
sented one end of a developmental continuum stretching from the simplest
human condition to the relatively civilized condition of western Europe.
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The most influential discussions of the ‘state of nature’ in the academic
literature on Locke have treated it in other terms. A recent paper by John
Dunn (2001) reaffirms his long-held view (Dunn, 1969: 97, 101, 113) that the
account of the state of nature which Locke presents in his Second Treatise of
Government is neither an hypothesis nor a description. Rather, he claims, it
is a ‘theoretical analysis of the fundamental relations of right and duty which
obtain between human beings, relations which are logically prior to the
particular historical situations in which all actual human beings always in fact
find themselves’ (Dunn, 2001: 43–4). Similarly, Ashcraft argues that Locke’s
state of nature should be seen as a ‘fiction’. It is ‘a logical construct’ which
sets out ‘the logical and moral conditions of human existence’and thus serves
as a ‘critique of existing society’. He suggests that this fiction is derived from
‘actual human history’ but is not intended as an historical description of
actual conditions (1969: 901, 901 n. 14, 914). Far from presenting the state of
nature as an historical description, an alternative to Filmer’s description
which he criticizes in his First Treatise, Locke ‘shifts the ground of his
argument’ and begins his Second Treatise with a legal-moral definition of the
state of nature (1969: 900). Ashcraft insists that Locke’s conception of the
state of nature is ‘not static, but developmental’. A developmental continuum
of the kind I have suggested is certainly envisaged here, but, in Ashcraft’s
view, it is to be found within the state of nature itself: ‘One must visualize
men [within this state] passing through several stages of economic and social
development’ (1969: 908–9). Simmons, too, stresses the moral flavour of
Locke’s account of the state of nature. Indeed, he argues, the ‘primary point
of the state of nature is . . . to describe a certain moral condition of man’, the
condition into which he was placed by God. Or the moral condition of not
being a citizen (1989: 463–4).
Dunn concludes his argument with the claim that ‘the idea of civil society
draws its power from . . . the analytically prior and altogether less anodyne
category of the state of nature’ (ibid.: 57). This claim seems to me broadly
correct, except for one substantial qualification which I introduce in a
moment. Yet it suggests that, if we tamper with the category of the state of
nature, this is likely to interfere with our understanding of civil society itself.
It is all the more important, then, to be clear about the category of the state
of nature.
I argue, in fact, that the representation of the state of nature as a ‘fiction’,
as a merely imaginary, ‘theoretical analysis’ of social relations or as an account
of the moral condition of not being a citizen, obscures the significance of the
early modern idea of a state of nature, not only for the work of Locke and
his near contemporaries, but also, more importantly, for the broader develop-
ment of western social and political thought. The idea of an original
condition of freedom and equality played a central role in Locke’s argument,
where it served as a means both to undermine the view that humans were
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born into a natural condition of subjection to the rule of others and to justify
European expropriation of land in the Americas. It also represented one end
of a developmental continuum, running from the original, most primitive,
condition of humanity through to the societies of contemporary western
Europe, which was thought to encompass all sections of humanity. The early
modern understanding of this developmental continuum was taken up most
profoundly by the great 18th-century project of conjectural history.2 While
the idea of an original asocial condition on which this continuum was based
was later brought into question, a closely related developmental framework
nevertheless informed subsequent movements in history and the social
sciences. This, in effect, is my qualification of Dunn’s claim regarding the link
between the idea of state of nature and of civil society: it is the developmental
perspective which the category of the state of nature represents and which it
helped to establish, rather than the category itself, which underlies contem-
porary discussion of civil society. After being abandoned in its original form,
this category was finally revived in 20th-century political theory, this time
precisely in the form that Dunn mistakenly ascribes to Locke.
The first part of the article suggests that the idea of the state of nature
performs several functions in Locke’s argument. This is followed by an
extended discussion of the epistemological status – as description, hypothesis,
‘fiction’ or ‘theoretical analysis’ – required of the state of nature in its
performance of these functions. I conclude by speculating on the signifi-
cance of the differences between these two very different perspectives on the
state of nature.
FOUR FUNCTIONS OF THE ‘STATE OF NATURE’
IN LOCKE’S DISCUSSION
Let me begin, then, with a preliminary response to the view that Locke’s
account of the state of nature was neither an hypothesis nor a description,
but rather a ‘fiction’ or a ‘theoretical analysis of . . . fundamental relations of
right and duty’. Perhaps the most obvious difficulty with this claim is that,
throughout his dispute with Filmer in the First Treatise which Ashcraft’s
discussion of Locke’s state of nature emphasizes, and again in important parts
of the Second (especially in chapters 2, 5 and 8), which Ashcraft does not
discuss, Locke himself is clearly concerned to establish the historical reality
of this condition. Locke’s well-known assertion that ‘in the beginning all the
World was America, and more so than it is now’ (1988: 2, # 49), which appears
in his discussion of money in the Second Treatise, is an affirmation of
precisely this claim.
Yet there is also a more serious point to be made here, which is that the idea
of the state of nature performs a number of functions in Locke’s discussion,
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and there is no reason to suppose that it has the same argumentative standing
– as hypothesis, description, ‘fiction’ or ‘theoretical analysis’ – in all of them.
In some of the arguments he develops, Locke’s account of the state of nature
appears just as Dunn and Ashcraft suggest, as neither hypothesis nor descrip-
tion, but in others its descriptive character is clearly fundamental. At least
four functions of the state of nature can be identified in the Two Treatises. I
outline these functions here before turning to the epistemological statuses
which the state of nature assumes in Locke’s various arguments.
The first function is to offer an alternative to Filmer’s patriarchalist account
of the origins of government, and especially to the view that men are and
have always been born under government, the biblical foundations of which
the First Treatise had set out to undermine, and thus that subjection to others
is a natural human condition (Ashcraft, 1969: 900). Here Locke’s account of
the state of nature is intended to show that ‘all Men are naturally in . . . a
State of perfect Freedom to order their Actions, and dispose of their Posses-
sions and Persons as they think fit. . . . A State also of Equality, wherein all
the Power and Jurisdiction is reciprocal, no one having more than another’
(ibid.: 2, # 4). The equality that is at issue here, Locke insists, applies only to
‘Jurisdiction or Dominion, one over another’. He acknowledges that, in
other respects, there have always been significant differences between people:
‘Age or Virtue may give Men a just Precedency: Excellency of Parts and
Merit may place others above the Common Level’ (ibid.: 54). Locke argues
that this state of freedom and equality was the original human condition, and
that it preceded the formation of government and the rule of some men over
others. It remains the condition in which people find themselves whenever
their actions are not subject to government: the condition of ‘Princes and
Rulers of Independent Governments’ and also, for example, a Swiss and an
Indian interacting ‘in the Woods of America’ (ibid.: 2, # 14). The political
theory of patriarchalism which Locke opposes here has few significant
supporters in the West today, and Dunn ignores it, not unreasonably, in his
paper on the contemporary political relevance of Locke’s argument.
Second, the idea of the state of nature provides foundations for Locke’s
account in this Treatise of the Law of Nature, which, as we shall see and as
Simmons (1989) suggests, also draws on theological foundations. As Locke
presents it, this law sets the boundaries to our natural liberty, and of the char-
acter of government. Locke sometimes seems to run these first two functions
together, as if the weakness of Filmer’s account establishes the strength of his
own alternative. Yet it also requires a separate argument, and much of
Locke’s discussion of the state of nature is devoted to this task. A third,
closely related, function is to support the distinctive analysis of property
which Locke sets out in chapters 2 and 5 of the Second Treatise, arguing
that it is based, in rather different ways, on both labour and legislation.
(Ashcraft, 1969: 910ff.). This analysis was used, in other contexts, to justify
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the expropriation of land in the Americas. Grotius’s and Pufendorf’s accounts
of differentiated property, which describe it as based on agreement, cannot
be bent so easily to this purpose. There were, of course, other elements in
Grotius’ work which provided the Dutch East India Company with a useful
rationale for expropriation by conquest (Tuck, 1999).
Finally, the most elementary form of Locke’s state of nature occupies a
region around one pole, the historical starting point, of a developmental telos
which encompasses all sections of humanity.3 The rather special civil societies
of the kind which had emerged in parts of western Europe are assumed to
be located near the other pole. Locke’s discussion, in chapter Five of the
Second Treatise, of the emergence and development of property shows that
these poles are separated, in his view, by a considerable period of historical
development. His treatment, in chapter Eight, of the beginning of political
society reinforces the point:
Government is every where antecedent to Records, and Letters seldome
come in amongst a People, till a long continuation of Civil Society has,
by other more necessary Arts, provided for their Safety, Ease, and Plenty.
(1988: 2, # 101)
The state of nature appears here as a condition in which many of the major
institutions of the modern world do not yet exist. Locke refers explicitly to
the absence of government and of private property in land. He presents
property of other kinds, to the extent that it exists at all, as having hardly
developed beyond usufruct. We might also note that Locke treats the term
‘civil society’ as referring to any substantial body of people who are subject
to the one legitimate government (Ashcraft, 1969: 910ff.). Here, in contrast
to our current usage, civil society and government are assumed to be co-
extensive. The long development of government and private property leading
up to the establishment of liberal regimes is not a pre-condition of civil
society, but something that may well take place within it.4
There are elements in Locke’s analysis here of the developmental under-
standing of humanity which, while it was an important part of Europe’s
classical heritage, re-emerged in European discussion in the aftermath of the
invasions of the Americas (Brandon, 1986; Cro, 1990; Haase and Reinhold,
1993; Jahn, 2000; Pagden, 1982; Ryan, 1981; Waswo, 1996, 1997). This aspect
of his argument was hardly disputed at the time. Moreover, while Locke’s
location of the Amerindian peoples of North America at a pre-political stage
of human development had important and destructive consequences, his
discussion has not been especially influential in the elaboration of develop-
mental histories of humanity. More empirically secure and intellectual
sophisticated developmental histories were widely available at the time, José
de Acosta’s work (which Locke cites at 2, # 102) being perhaps the most
important (Pagden, 1982).5 Partly for these reasons, this aspect of Locke’s
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work has not often been picked up in discussions by political theorists and
historians of political thought, and the papers cited earlier, by Ashcraft, Dunn
and Simmons, on Locke’s state of nature are certainly no exceptions.6
However, the fact that Locke’s developmental history was relatively un-
sophisticated and had little impact on its subsequent elaborations should not
be taken to mean that it plays no significant part in his argument. We have
just noted its role, for example, in his discussions of property and of govern-
ment. Developmental assumptions are at the heart of Locke’s accounts, both
of the state of nature, as Ashcraft notes, and of civil society. The same, or
closely related, assumptions pervade the contemporary social sciences, with
anthropology and related areas of linguistics providing a number of signifi-
cant exceptions (Fabian, 1983). This, of course, suggests another reason why
the developmental assumptions at work in Locke’s arguments have received
little critical attention from political theorists and historians of political
thought, which is that few of them have seen these assumptions as being in
any way problematic. These, or closely related, developmental assumptions
also underlie our own conception of civil society, which is rather different
from Locke’s. Consequently, they play a central role in the geo-political
understandings that dominate the contemporary system of states.7 Thus,
contrary to the explicit political claims of Dunn’s paper, in which these issues
have no place, the developmental aspects of Locke’s concepts of the state of
nature and civil society have considerable political relevance today.
DESCRIPTIONS AND IMAGINATIVE
CONSTRUCTIONS
What can we say of the epistemological status of the idea of the state of nature
– whether as hypothesis, description, ‘fiction’ or ‘theoretical analysis’ – in
these different parts of Locke’s argument? As far as the first function is
concerned, the answer is straightforward. If Locke’s account of an original
condition of freedom and equality is to serve as an effective alternative to the
patriarchalist view that subjection to others is the natural human condition,
then it has to work as a description of the true natural condition of humanity.
Indeed, as Barbara Arneil points out, one of Locke’s main criticisms of Filmer
is that he fails to provide reliable evidence in support of his analysis of the
real character of government (1996: 16). Thus, for Locke to have argued
against Filmer that we might like to imagine a world in which all people were
free and equal, and, further, as Dunn’s interpretation of Locke’s argument
would have him claim, that this imaginary world is the most appropriate
starting point for a ‘theoretical analysis of the fundamental relations of right
and duty which obtain between human beings’, would not have been produc-
tive. Locke’s account of the state of nature has to work as a description, not
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only of the condition in which ‘Rulers of Independent Governments’ find
themselves in their dealings with each other (which Filmer’s argument could
accommodate without much difficulty), but also of the early historical
condition of humanity itself.
Locke tries to establish the reality of this condition in various ways. He
does so, first, through the attack on Filmer’s interpretation of the book of
Genesis which dominates his First Treatise. Filmer’s reading of Genesis is
highly tendentious, and Locke’s arguments against it are strong. Yet the
limitations of Filmer’s interpretation do little to establish the truth of Locke’s
alternative. Second, he appeals to Greek and Roman sources and the classical
myth of a Golden Age, which had enjoyed a significant revival in Europe
following the early reports of conditions in the Americas.8 Finally, as noted
above, he draws on recent or contemporary evidence from the Americas. The
first and last of these are clearly the most important for Locke’s argument, and
he often runs the American material together with his interpretations of scrip-
ture. Paragraph 144 of the First Treatise, for example, moves from ridiculing
Filmer’s patriarchal reading of the lines ‘These are the Sons of Shem after their
Families, after their Tongues in their Lands, after their Nations’, which it does
by reference to the diverse national backgrounds of Hannibal’s army and
again of the colonists of Carolina, to a brief description of an America in
which ‘every little Tribe was a distinct People, with a different Language’.
Here, and at other points in his discussion, Locke uses recent evidence
from the New World to reinforce his claims about the ancient peoples of the
Old. Systematic comparison between the customs of the New World and
those of the ancient peoples of the Old can be found in the work of European
writers as early as the publication of Las Casas’ Historia de las Indias, which
began in 1527. Yet, as Peter Mason notes, there is a fine line between this
practice and the use, as in Locke’s discussion, of apparent parallels to suggest
the existence of ‘a more deeply seated isomorphism’.9 By the early 18th
century, if not before, the European belief in the existence of such an iso-
morphism was well established. We find Lafitau, for example, filling in details
about the New World ‘by “reading them off”, as it were, from the better
documented old World’10 and Fontenelle reversing the procedure, using the
New World to throw light on the old.11 The assumption of a parallelism, or
even isomorphism, between the contemporary peoples of the New World
and ancient peoples of the Old is the first step in the early modern elabora-
tion of a broader kind of parallel, this time between the historical and the
contemporary geographical dispersions of peoples, which soon became
remarkably influential in European thought. We might think, for example,
of Edmund Burke’s well-known letter to William Robertson, in which he
observes that all human conditions are now ‘under our view’ on the surface
of the globe,12 or Freidrich von Schiller’s more elaborate proclamation, in his
inaugural lecture as Professor of History only a few years later, that the
European discoveries
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. . . afford us a spectacle which is as instructive as it is entertaining. They
show us societies arrayed around us at various levels of development,
as an adult might be surrounded by children of different ages, reminded
by their example of what he himself once was and whence he started.
A wise hand seems to have preserved these savage tribes until such time
as we have progressed sufficiently in our own civilization to make useful
application of this discovery, and from this mirror to recover the lost
beginning of our race.13
The most striking, and also the most disturbing, feature of this perception is
the combination of a developmental view of humanity with the suggestion
that many of our contemporaries, living in distant parts of the world, really
belong to an earlier historical epoch. Locke’s Two Treatises appear at an early
stage in the elaboration by educated Europeans of this self-serving view of
their own historical significance. This ‘denial of coevalness’,14 remains influ-
ential, even today, not only in the treatment by western states of their
indigenous inhabitants but also in the broader geo-political order.
If the reality of Locke’s state of nature is required for the first of the func-
tions it performs in the Two Treatises, things become vastly more compli-
cated when we turn to the second and third functions outlined above. Locke’s
arguments here suppose that Filmer’s patriarchalism has already been cleared
out of the way, and thus that the state of nature, more or less as Locke
describes it, offers an alternative, more realistic, picture of the original human
condition. On the one hand, then, the descriptive character of his account of
the state of nature is already assumed in Locke’s more detailed discussions
of government and of property.
On the other hand, though, in addition to the undermining of Filmer’s
patriarchalism, these discussions are also designed to further other political
and intellectual objectives. Among the most important of these are: to explain
how particularization of the property which God gave to mankind in common
is possible; to establish that there is no natural right to private property in
land; and to deny or, at least, ‘to obscure and downgrade the distinctive
features of Amerindian polity and property’.15 Locke’s analysis, we might
say, is severely overdetermined. It is a mark of his rhetorical skills that he
pursues these various objectives as effectively as he does within the one text.
We should hardly be surprised, however, to find that there are tensions
between the different parts of his argument or, which is the issue that most
concerns us here, that his analysis of the state of nature does not always
conform to what either the empirical evidence at his disposal or his philo-
sophical arguments would lead us to expect.16 In this respect, at least, Dunn’s
claim is incontrovertible: Locke’s account of the state of nature simply does
not work either as description or as hypothesis.
Locke, in fact, tries to have it both ways. If there are few recorded instances
of governments being established in the manner he suggests, this, he tells us,
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is simply because ‘Government is every where antecedent to Records’ (1988:
2, # 101). He nevertheless cites three, rather dubious, historical examples –
the founding of Rome, Venice and Tarentum – which, as he presents them,
show ‘People free and in the State of Nature . . . [who] met together incor-
porated and began a Commonwealth’ (ibid.: 2, # 103). These debating points
might work as a response to Filmer, but they hardly let him off the empiri-
cal hook in other respects. While Locke cites evidence from the Americas
to establish the reality of the state of nature, for example, his usage is highly
selective, ignoring, in other parts of his argument, the established forms of
government and settled agriculture which could be found in many Amerindian
communities.17 This, of course, is precisely what his concern, just noted, to
downgrade ‘distinctive features of Amerindian polity and property’ would
lead us to expect.
Yet there is a more substantial reason for the shortage of empirical evidence
to support Locke’s account. It concerns the character of the law of nature,
and thus of the development of government and of property which he
presents as taking place under its auspices. The law of nature, as Locke and
other natural law theorists describe it, sets out the obligations under which
we all exist. It is not, and is not intended to be, a description of the laws that
were actually followed by people in the earliest stages of human develop-
ment. The state of nature, he tells us
. . . has a Law of Nature to govern it, which obliges every one: and
Reason, which is that Law, teaches all Mankind, who will but consult
it, that being equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in
his Life, Health, Liberty, or Possessions. (1988: 2, # 6)
The phrase, ‘who will but consult it’, warns us that this passage should not
be read as a description of how people conduct themselves in the state of
nature. It tells us that the teachings of the law of nature are available to
humanity, at least in principle, not that all humanity can be expected to
acknowledge them. Indeed, other parts of Locke’s argument suggest that
most of those who live in the state of nature will be unfamiliar with their
obligations under this law. Immediately following the lines just quoted, he
explains:
For Men being all the Workmanship of one Sovereign Master, sent into
the World by his order and about his business, they are his Property,
whose Workmanship they are, made to last during his, not one another’s
Pleasure.
This sets the scene for Locke’s analysis of property, which I consider briefly
below. It also suggests that the content which Locke ascribes to the law of
nature is the product of a particular, monotheistic world-view. Locke does
not claim that adherents of other religions or of no religion at all, will refuse
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to acknowledge the law of nature. However, his discussion does suggest that
the content he ascribes to this law is most likely to be accepted by those who
share his view of the relationship between the world and its creator. Thus, if
we find that there are people, like the indigenous peoples of the New World,
who do not share this world-view, neither should we be surprised if they fail
to acknowledge the particular obligations which they have under the law of
nature.
In the Essay, Locke goes even further:
. . . hath not navigation discovered . . . whole nations . . . amongst
whom there was to be found no notion of a God, no religion? . . . These
are instances of nations where uncultivated nature has been left to itself,
without the help of letters and discipline, and the improvements of arts
and sciences. But there are others to be found who have enjoyed these
in a very great measure, who yet, for want of a due application of their
thoughts this way, want the idea and knowledge of God. (1957: book
4, ch. 4, # 8)
The discussion from which this passage is taken is disturbing for many
reasons. Locke insists on the importance of the belief that God is to be
worshipped, but maintains that even this principle is not innate and has to
be reasoned out. His discussion suggests, not only that there are whole
nations ignorant of their obligations under the law of nature, but also, in a
sense, that their ignorance results from a failure to apply their thoughts in
the appropriate fashion. In a sense, it is their own fault.18 The practical signifi-
cance of this point derives from the familiar claim that the law of nature gives
us a right to use force against those who, if only through ignorance, fail to
acknowledge their lawful obligations towards us. Locke’s law of nature, like
Vitoria’s christianized jus gentium before it, thus allows ample scope for
justifying the conquest of non-Christian peoples by Christian nations.19
More importantly, for our purposes, Locke’s account of the law of nature is
not open to correction by empirical evidence regarding the practices of
peoples without what he would recognize as government. It is not intended
either as a description of, or an hypothesis about, the obligations that would
in fact be recognized by those who belong to nations ‘where uncultivated
nature has been left to itself, without the help of letters and discipline’.
Yet, if Locke’s account of the law of nature is neither hypothesis nor descrip-
tion, this will also be the case for his accounts of the origins of government
and the development of property, both of which take place under its auspices.
Here are the opening lines from ‘Of the Beginning of Political Societies’:
Men being, as has been said, by Nature, all free, equal and independent,
no one can be put out of this Estate, and subjected to the Political
power of another, without his own Consent. The only way whereby
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any one devests himself of his Natural Liberty, and puts on the bonds
of Civil Society is by agreeing with other Men to join and unite into a
Community . . . (1988: 2, # 95)
This is a statement about rights and the legitimacy of political power. It is
neither an hypothesis about how people unfamiliar with their rights and obli-
gations under the law of nature might be expected to behave, nor a descrip-
tion of how the earliest institutionalized relations between ruler and ruled
have in fact been established. In this respect, the evidence of settled relations
of this kind among many Amerindian peoples has no bearing on his argument.
I have already noted that Locke’s analysis of property has a number of
objectives. One of these, which he shares with other natural law theorists, is
to explain how particularization of the common property of mankind is
possible. Grotius and Pufendorf try to deal with this question by reference
to agreement among men. While their arguments are rather different, both
suggest that differentiated forms of property have a conventional character,
and thus that they might be amenable to historical investigation, at least in
principle. Locke takes a different tack, distinguishing between the property
that exists under government, which does have a legal and conventional char-
acter, and property in the state of nature, which does not.20 In the latter case,
Locke argues, property resides primarily in the product of one’s own labour,
which one might choose to transfer to another, and in a right to the use of
land and other natural resources. This last is always subject to the condition
that enough of this common property of mankind must remain for others to
use. Since these rights exist under natural law, they must also be preserved
by the legal and conventional forms of property that are established under
government.
This argument has a number of consequences, which also serve the politi-
cal objectives of Locke’s analysis. It shows, in particular, that there is no
natural right to private property in land, and that, apart from usufruct and
the product of one’s labour, there can be no differentiated property where
there is no government. Thus, while differentiated private property has a
conventional character, and its forms are therefore amenable to historical
investigation, such property cannot exist among people living in the state of
nature. The conventions established by the indigenous peoples of North
America have nothing to do with property as Locke understands it here. In
this case, too, evidence of settled arrangements among Amerindian peoples
has no bearing on his argument.
Finally, I suggested that the idea of the state of nature performs a fourth
function in Locke’s analysis, which is to occupy an extended region around
one end of a developmental continuum. Its epistemological status in this
respect – as description, hypothesis or ‘fiction’ – has been addressed in the
course of my discussion of its other functions, and it can be dealt with very
HISTORY OF THE HUMAN SCIENCES 20(3)12
01 HINDESS 079331  29/4/07  2:38 am  Page 12
briefly here. On the one hand, the state of nature represents the real historical
condition of the early part of humanity. It is a condition in which, with the
exception of the Jews, who have a special relationship with God, people are
generally ignorant of their rights and obligations under the law of nature.
Moreover, as Locke describes it in the Essay, this is also a condition in which
‘uncultivated nature has been left to itself, without the help of letters and
discipline, and the improvements of arts and sciences’. In contrast to the
highly cultivated civil societies of the western parts of Europe in Locke’s
time, the state of nature represents the primitive, barely cultivated, human
condition.
On the other hand, in his accounts of the development of government and
of property, the state of nature is a condition in which people are in fact
governed by the law of nature, and thus by reason. It is these hypothetical
people who agree to subject themselves to government in order to rectify the
inconveniences of their natural condition. Here, too, the state of nature
represents a primitive condition in contrast to the civil societies of Locke’s
time, but in this case, as Dunn suggests, it is clearly a theoretical construc-
tion. There are, in fact, two states of nature at work in Locke’s analysis, and
two developmental continua which depart from it, one historical and the
other purely hypothetical. Both are necessary to his overall argument, but
only one of them has any foundation in the empirical materials available to
him at the time.
CONCLUSION: THE STATE OF NATURE IN
MODERN SOCIAL THOUGHT
My opening discussion suggested that the representation of the state of nature
as a merely imaginary, ‘theoretical analysis’ of social relations obscures the
broader significance of the early modern idea of a state of nature, not only
for the work of Locke and his near contemporaries, but also, more impor-
tantly, for the broader development of western social and political thought.
I conclude this article by briefly addressing these two claims. I have indicated
some of the complexities and ambiguities, one might almost say ‘evasions’ or
‘confusions’, that appear in Locke’s use of this idea. I noted, in particular,
that there are places where his account of the state of nature cannot be under-
stood as a merely imaginary, ‘theoretical analysis’ and places where it hardly
makes sense to understand it otherwise. We have seen that ‘the fundamental
relations of right and duty’ which Locke identifies in these latter cases derive
from a monotheistic world-view which, as Locke interprets it, renders the
greater part of humanity in his time – and a still significant proportion in our
own – ignorant of their rights and obligations under the law of nature, and
thus leaves them vulnerable to the actions of those who treat breaches of this
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law as grounds for punitive response. Locke compounds this problem by
effectively blaming the victims of such punitive actions, attributing their
ignorance to ‘want of a due application of their thoughts’. This sectarian
aspect of Locke’s ‘theoretical analysis’ is hardly acknowledged in Dunn’s
discussion. Locke’s account of civil society may well appeal to comfortable
denizens of the secure and prosperous civil societies of the modern West, few
of whom are likely to be familiar with its sectarian foundations, but it remains
dangerous and destructive in many political contexts. We should be wary of
any account of ‘the fundamental relations of right and duty which obtain
between human beings’ that appears to rely on such a tainted source.
As for my second claim, concerning the place of the idea of the state of
nature in the development of modern social thought more generally, it may
be useful to distinguish between two contemporary styles or traditions of
social thought. One presents a normative account of government, and some-
times of other social institutions, providing criteria which can be used to
justify and to criticize political rule. The other tradition is that of an empiri-
cal history or social science which is universal in its aspirations. While often
focusing on developments in a particular time and place, writers in this
tradition nevertheless locate their work within an empirical and conceptual
frame which claims to encompass all of humanity. The idea of an original
human condition of freedom and equality occupies an important position in
the early stages of both traditions.21 Locke appears as a significant figure in
the first of these traditions, and as rather less significant in the second, but,
as we have seen, each of them plays an important part in his arguments.
When normative argument appeals to an original condition, the attributes
of freedom and equality appear in what we might call a positive sense. People
are presented as being aware of their rights and obligations under the law of
nature, and thus also of the sense in which they are free and equal. In order
to overcome the inconveniences of this condition, which, after a time, they
also clearly recognize, they agree to come together into a commonwealth.
This state of nature is the condition which Locke invokes in the passage,
quoted earlier, from the Second Treatise, which tells us that the state of nature
. . . has a Law of Nature to govern it, which obliges every one: and
Reason, which is that Law, teaches all Mankind, who will but consult
it, that being equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in
his Life, Health, Liberty, or Possessions. (1988: 2, # 6)
However, when this normative perspective is no longer dominant and the
original condition of freedom and equality is invoked in the course of empiri-
cal analysis, these same attributes appear in a negative sense. The fact that the
early condition of humanity is one of freedom and equality is now seen as
reflecting the absence of complex social institutions, and the absence, in
particular, of institutionalized relations between rulers and ruled. We have
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seen, for example, that the equality which Locke identifies in this condition
applies only to ‘Jurisdiction or Dominion, one over another’. ‘Age or Virtue
may give Men a just Precedency: Excellency of Parts and Merit may place
others above the Common Level’ (ibid.: 2, # 54). The absence of other social
institutions is reflected in the condition of nations whose people are un-
familiar with their obligations under the law of nature, ‘where uncultivated
nature has been left to itself, without the help of letters and discipline, and
the improvements of arts and sciences’ (1957: book 1, ch. 4, # 8). This more
empirical variant of Locke’s state of nature roughly corresponds to what
Acosta and other authorities at the time described as the least advanced
condition to be found among the peoples of the Americas. Locke’s discussion
here also conforms to Acosta’s analysis of what distinguishes these peoples
from those who appear to be more advanced.22 Acosta insists that we all share
a common humanity, but some peoples have institutions – language, writing,
government – which others do not. According to this view, their condition
can be improved through cultivation and the establishment of appropriate
institutions.23 Thus, what distinguishes the more from the less cultivated
peoples, is simply the level of cultivation and the social institutions of which
that cultivation is the result. The early condition of humanity appears in these
writings as the asocial starting point of a developmental continuum which
leads, through the progressive formation of social institutions, up to the civil
societies that had emerged in the western part of Europe.
Although the historical state of nature takes these two distinct forms in
Locke’s work, he does not clearly distinguish between them and at times he
seems almost to run them together. He maintains, for example, that the teach-
ings of the law of nature are available to anyone ‘who will but consult it’
(1988: 2, # 6). This suggests that the ignorance of the law of nature which
characterizes his second, empirically based, variant of the state of nature, is
simply the result of a failure to consult it. His Essay argues, as we have seen,
that the same failure can be observed even amongst more cultivated people
who, ‘for want of a due application of their thoughts this way, want the idea
and knowledge of God’ (1957: book 1, ch. 4, # 8). However, what concerns
us here is the relationship between the two variants of the state of nature.
There are places where Locke seems to suggest that what distinguishes them
is little more than the culpability of those who inhabit the second. Here he
clearly indulges in an all too familiar way of thinking about western
encroachment on the peoples of the non-western world, which is simply to
blame the victims.
With the refinement and consolidation of the empirical tradition – with the
emergence, in other words, of what we now think of as the disciplines of social
science and history – the tensions between the normative and empirical
variants of the state of nature became more difficult to sustain. A century after
Locke, we find David Hume arguing that there is little sense in appealing to
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the idea of the formation of government through an original contract since
(as Locke in empirical mode could have told him) the capacities required for
such a contract are clearly not sufficiently developed among uncultivated
peoples.24 Kant, in what now seems to have been a rearguard action, hangs
on to the idea of an original contract by turning it into a regulative idea, not
an historical event. The original contract, he tells us, is the act
. . . by which the people constitutes a state for itself, or more precisely,
the mere idea of such an act (which alone enables us to consider it valid
in terms of right).25
Thereafter, the idea of an original condition was abandoned by normative
theory, only to emerge again in different forms in the works of Robert
Nozick and John Rawls in the latter part of the 20th century. It appears now
as a theoretical analysis, with no descriptive pretensions, ‘of the fundamental
relations of right and duty which obtain between human beings’ – that is, in
precisely the form that Dunn ascribes to Locke. We have seen that there are
parts of Locke’s discussion in which the state of nature cannot be understood
as a ‘theoretical analysis’ of this kind, and parts where it makes no sense to
understand it otherwise. In the latter case, however, its claim to address
relations that are fundamental rests on a sectarian religious foundation. Yet
Nozick and Rawls are unwilling to rely on any such foundation. The latter
rests his argument, at least in his later work, on the empirical, but unsub-
stantiated, claim that the principles reflected in the design of his original
condition are in fact embedded in the major institutions of contemporary
western societies. These principles are fundamental, but only for those whose
conduct is already organized around them.
The idea of a developmental continuum, along which different portions of
humanity move from an original asocial condition through the progressive
establishment of social institutions, reached its fullest development in the
great 18th-century projects of conjectural history and the 19th-century
systems which built upon them.26 The idea of an original asocial condition
was abandoned under the influence of evolutionary ideas, but the social
sciences and history have nevertheless generally retained their allegiance to
the idea of a single developmental continuum, albeit one in which the starting
point is now conceived rather differently. There has also been some resist-
ance to this idea, of course, with many authors insisting that movement along
the continuum is not always to the good, and others (for example, Diderot
and Herder27) advancing the more radical claim that the attempt to locate all
human communities on a single continuum should itself be abandoned.28
This last claim has been taken up by a number of contemporary anthropol-
ogists.29 Elsewhere in the social sciences and history, both the idea of a single
developmental continuum (or at least, of a single destination) and the rele-
gation of many of our contemporaries to an earlier historical period have
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largely retained their hold. They also retain their hold over the government
of indigenous peoples, the governing institutions of the contemporary inter-
national order, and the programmes of political and economic development
that take place within it. The modern understanding of civil society may be
rather different from Locke’s – mainly because it is thought to be located
further along the developmental continuum – but it rests on a no less prob-
lematic, developmental understanding of humanity.
NOTES
1 Supporters of modern cosmopolitanism would do well to remember that its
attractively inclusive vision of a cosmopolitan future relies on the less appealing,
but no less inclusive, idea that all sections of humanity can be located in the one
universal history whose character is exhibited most clearly in the development
of the modern West.
2 Dugald Stewart (1980) introduces the term ‘conjectural history’ and provides a
clear statement of its ambitions. Cf. Wokler (1995).
3 Ashcraft (1969, especially section 2) insists on the developmental character of
Locke’s account of the state of nature. Cf. Simmons (1989: 458f.).
4 See note 3.
5 Laslett’s Introduction to the Cambridge edition of Locke’s Two Treatises suggests
that ‘Locke may be said to have done more than anyone else to found the study
of comparative anthropology’ (1988: 99, n.). A far stronger case, as Pagden (1982)
shows, could be made for Acosta. Locke’s use of the empirical materials available
to him is tendentious and misleading. Laslett goes on to describe Locke’s position
as being that, while natural man cannot be proved to have existed in peace and
sociability, the evidence does not make such a view impossible. This is the view
of Locke’s state of nature as an hypothesis, which is one of the targets of Dunn’s
analysis. 
6 But see Arneil (1996), Tully (1993) and, on the state of nature more generally,
Brandon (1986) and Jahn (2000).
7 Pagden (1998) makes a similar point starting from Kant’s elaboration of the same
developmental theme, which is rather more sophisticated than Locke’s.
8 Cro (1990, 1993); Levin (1969).
9 Mason (1993: 154).
10 (ibid.: 155).
11 Iacono (1993); Ryan (1981).
12 Burke to Robertson, 9 June 1777.
13 Schiller (1972: 325).
14 Cf. Fabian (1983).
15 Tully, (1993: 139). Cf. Armitage (2004).
16 His tendentious and highly selective use of American materials is documented in
Arneil (1996). Grant (1988) and Waldron (1989) point out that anthropological
evidence does not support his analysis of government.
17 Again, see Arneil (1996); Tully (1993).
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18 His comment on the unlettered king Apochancana reinforces this last point.
‘And if he had not any idea of a God, it was only because he pursued not those
thoughts that would have lead him to it’ (1988: 2, # 12).
19 Tully (1993: ch. 5). Arneil (1996: 163f.) concedes the point but argues, on the basis
of the Second Treatise, ch. 16, ‘On Conquest’, that Locke does not recognize
conquest as a basis for the appropriation of property in America. Perhaps, but
Locke’s account of property provides all the justification he needs.
20 These three natural law accounts of property are discussed in Tully (1993); Arneil
(1996).
21 There is an irreducible element of retrospective construction in the identification
of these traditions, as there is, in fact, with all traditions. Thus, in noting that we
can now distinguish between them, I do not intend to suggest that, in their earlier
stages, they either could or should have been distinguished by people living at
the time.
22 Cf. Batz (1974).
23 Pagden (1982). 
24 ‘On the Original Contract’ in Hume (1987).
25 Kant (1970: 140; emphasis added).
26 Cf. Wokler (1995).
27 See the discussion of these figures in Muthu (2003) and of Herder in Denby
(2003).
28 Cf. Boas (1940: 282).
29 Fabian (1983) and, more recently, the contributions by Marc Pinkoski and Michael
Asch to Barnard (2004) and Pluciennik (2005).
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